Two years before Yumeko Jabami transferred, Sayaka observed a gamble match between the former Student Council President and Kirari Momobami, then a first-year transfer student, over a presidential position. Sayaka was so impressed by Kirari's victory that she applied for a position as her personal secretary in the Student Council. As Sayaka caught Kirari's attention, she hired her and gave her a little makeover along the way.
She chose one of the outer doors and subconsciously took the one, whose answer is 5, because the Tower had five floors. She stated her love for Kirari one last time and jumped. She already accepted her death, but Kirari jumped after her. Sayaka was terrified, thinking Kirari would now die too. But they landed on a safety mat. Kirari laughed and Sayaka was still shook. Kirari proceeds to tell her, that she is absolutely fascinated by her and how she acts only logical. Kirari then again asks her to become her secretary anew, since they are now strangers. Sayaka has now learnt, that she will never be able to truly understand her, but that is exactly where their feelings come from.
There are also concerns about the workings of the Secretariat. Internal reports show that members are worried that it lacks transparency and clarity over its mission, and are uncertain about its funding going forward. Scotland has faced accusations of favoritism for awarding contracts to personal friends, leading UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson to take the unusual step of opposing her reappointment to a second term as secretary-general.
McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decision making on weapon development and many other budget issues. The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that \"this ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars.... You have to make a judgment on how much is enough.\" Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction program, which, he reported, saved $14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional districts, he closed many military bases and installations that he judged unnecessary for national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures.
Although South Vietnam by 1964 was receiving a sum of American economic and military aid that ran to $2 million per day, the South Vietnamese state was falling apart with corruption reaching such a point that most South Vietnamese civil servants and soldiers were not being paid while the projects for \"rural pacification\" that the United States had paid for had collapsed as the money had instead been stolen. The advice that McNamara and other American officials gave to the South Vietnamese to make reforms to crack down on corruption and make the government more effective was always ignored as by this point the South Vietnamese government knew very well that the Americans, having repeatedly promised in public that they would never permit the \"loss\" of South Vietnam, were now prisoners of their own rhetoric. The threats to withhold aid were bluffs, which the South Vietnamese exposed by simply ignoring the American advice, leading to a situation whereby Stanley Karnow, the Vietnam correspondent for Time noted:\"...America lacked leverage...For the South Vietnamese knew that the United States could not abandon them without damaging its own prestige. So despite their reliance on American aid, now more than a half-billion dollars a year, they could safely defy American dictates. In short, their weakness was their strength\". One South Vietnamese minister told Karnow at the time: \"Our big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war more than we do\". To compensate for the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese state, by late winter of 1964, senior officials in the Johnson administration such as McNamara's deputy, William Bundy, the assistant secretary of defense, were advocating American intervention in the war. Such intervention presented a constitutional problem: to intervene on the scale envisioned would mean waging war, and only Congress had the legal power to declare war. Fearful of causing a war with China, Johnson was opposed to the plans of Khánh to invade North Vietnam, and he was even less enthusiastic about having the United States invade North Vietnam. To declare war on North Vietnam would lead to irresistible political pressure at home to invade North Vietnam. As such, the solution was floated for Congress to pass a resolution granting Johnson the power to wage war in Vietnam.
As a Christmas gesture, Johnson ordered a bombing pause over North Vietnam and went off to his ranch in Texas for the holidays. McNamara went with his family for skiing in Colorado, but upon hearing that the president was open to extending the bombing pause for a few more days, he left his family at the sky lodge in the Rockies to fly to the Johnson ranch on 27 December 1965. McNamara knew that Johnson tended to listen to the advice of Rusk who saw extending the bombing pause as weakness, and wanted a meeting with Johnson without Rusk present. McNamara argued to the president in a three hour long meeting that the North Vietnamese would not open peace talks unless the bombing were stopped first, as they kept saying repeatedly, and persuaded Johnson to extend the bombing pause into January. At a New Year's Eve party attended by Washington's elite to welcome 1966, McNamara expressed doubts about America's ability to win the war. A week later at a dinner party attended by the economist John Kenneth Galbraith and Johnson's speechwriter Dick Goodwin, McNamara stated that victory was unobtainable, and the best that could be achieved was an \"honorable withdrawal\" that might save South Vietnam as a state. In February 1966, during the Honolulu conference, McNamara during an \"off-the-record\" chat with a group of journalists spoke about the war in very jaded terms, stating frankly that Operation Rolling Thunder was a failure. McNamara stated that North Vietnam was a backward Third World country that did not have the same advanced industrial infrastructure of First World nations, making the bombing offensive useless. McNamara concluded: \"No amount of bombing can end the war\". Karnow, one of the journalists present during the \"off-the-record\" conversation, described McNamara's personality as having changed, noting the Defense Secretary, who was normally so arrogant and self-assured, convinced he could \"scientifically\" solve any problem, as being subdued and clearly less self-confident.
McNamara left office on February 29, 1968; for his efforts, the President awarded him both the Medal of Freedom and the Distinguished Service Medal. McNamara's last day as Defense Secretary was a memorable one. The hawkish National Security Adviser, Walt Whitman Rostow, argued at a cabinet meeting that day that the United States was on the verge of winning the war. Rostow urged Johnson to send 206,000 more American troops to South Vietnam to join the half-million already there and to drastically increase the number of bombing raids on North Vietnam. At that point, McNamara snapped in fury at Rostow, saying: \"What then This goddamned bombing campaign, it's worth nothing, it's done nothing, they dropped more bombs than on all of Europe in all of World War II and it hasn't done a fucking thing!\" McNamara then broke down in tears, saying to Johnson to just accept that the war could not be won and stop listening to Rostow. Henry McPherson, an aide to the president, recalled the scene: \"He reeled off the familiar statistics-how we had dropped more bombs on Vietnam than on all of Europe during World War II. Then his voice broke, and there were tears on his eyes as he spoke of the futility, the crushing futility of the air war. The rest of us sat silently-I for one with my mouth open, listening to the secretary of defense talk that way about a campaign for which he had, ultimately, been responsible. I was pretty shocked\".
Eric's workplace is absolutely no escape from his everyday problems. His boss, Paul Power (known as PP), is loud, rude and demanding; he has demoted Eric from Assistant Manager to a low-level clerk in an office sandwiched between the janitor's closet and the men's toilets. His secretary Alison is completely useless, spending all her \"working hours\" in personal phone calls and shrilling rudely at Eric when he requests her attention.
But the Soviets never broke the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and smaller warheads became the norm. Warheads that could be mounted in multiples and independently targeted on a single missile, or put into submarines, became the core of the arsenal. Large, high-yield weapons would, eventually, be mostly phased out. The dismissal of the uselessness of the Tsar Bomba would become orthodoxy, as even the CIA (eventually) concluded that the Soviets were not going to field such a thing in numbers or try to put superbombs on missiles.
She constantly calls herself useless and genuinely fears that her weakness causes trouble for others trying to protect her. Kasumi admits to gripping her sword tightly out of fear of dying; however, with the right motivation, she is willing to risk her life against a stronger enemy.
Kasumi accompanies principal Yoshinobu, as his secretary, to a meeting with principal Masamichi Yaga. As Yoshinobu talks with Gojo, Kasumi thinks about how cool Gojo is while they wait for Masamichi. Kasumi is shocked when Gojo tells them that Masamichi will arrive in 2 hours, as he is leaving. When Yoshinobu tells her to go get him some tea, Kasumi obliges while hoping to get a picture with Gojo. She is able to get a photo with Gojo but forgets about the tea. 59ce067264